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Introduction
Bergamo’s conference on the metaphysics of properties and relations was one ofthe most attractive conferences that recently took place in Italy. When we firstlooked at the program some nine months ago, few things if anything could havecontained our enthusiasm: Not only did it confirm that properties and relationskeep exerting large interest at all levels of the discipline, but it brought togethersome among the most reputed scholars and promised to bring about novel issues aswell as thought-provoking proposals. We immediately set up a team of RIFAJ-editorswhose competences could have most nearly approximate the covered topics.Ilaria Canavotto considered Kevin Mulligan’s defence of the thesis that connec-tives are more fundamental than predicates and his attempt to make a weak anda strong form of realism about the semantic value of connectives (which he calls‘connectors’) compatible. She also outlined Fabrice Correia’s proposal of exploitingthe notion of generic identity in order to account for central metaphysical con-cepts, such as generic essence, generic subsumption, and generic ground. FabioCeravolo covered Peter Van Inwagen’s partly meta-ontological defense of transcen-dent universals and Ralf Busse’s attack on the alliance of dispositional essentialismand graph theory against the objection that the relational analysis of dispositionsinvolves a vicious circularity. Maria Scarpati took care of Anna-Sofia Maurin’s at-tempt to show that – contra some important objections – there are understandingsof the nature of tropes that are coherent and suitable for the aims of trope theory, ofGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s illustration of two theoretical roles that indiscernibleuniversals could fulfill and of Andrea Bottani’s outline of Locationist Nominalism – anew theory of properties according to which both determinables and determinatessupervene together on individuals.
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Taking an overall perspective on the conference, we noticed that a number ofphilosophical questions, each of its own interest, may be made to fit the single label“metaphysics of properties and relations”. As a matter of fact, contributions coveredtopics as apparently diverse as the rooted dispute on universals and the recentadvancements in the metaphysics of science. Yet we were pleased to notice notjust a merely proclaimed but insubstantial will of unification, but, rather, concreteand at times very successful integration attempts – as the present report repeatedlyremarks.A word of thanks on behalf of the community represented by this journal goesto the organisers Andrea Bottani, Barbara Malvestiti, Alfredo Tomasetta, ThomasSattig, and to all the speakers. To Andrea we sincerely wish best of luck on hisproject for a renewed Bergamo department. Few are brave enough to challengean entrenched auto-referential system by putting forward a proposal modeled ontop-level international standards. Grazie.
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1 In Defence of Transcendent UniversalsPeter Van Inwagen (University of Notre Dame)
Consider the following statement: as metaphysical theories explain our semanticattitudes and ordinary beliefs, addressing the question of the nature of universals ispartly a matter of explanatory virtue. Many metaphysicians straightforwardly agree.For instance, the existence and nature of universals is derived by virtue of its beingthe best explanation of some relevant data, such as the internal unity of classes innatural and scientific language. This is also completely familiar to the contemporaryreader, as metaphysics textbooks standardly introduce the dispute on universals byeliciting intuitions about collections of things under similarity. However, character-istically for Van Inwagen, the metaphysicians’ task is more ambitiously construed:the existence of universals must be endorsed not merely as an explanatory basis fora semantic datum but as the result of genuinely a priori enquiry. For this and otherreasons, a view such as Armstrong’s, which does away with universals on purelyexplanatory grounds incurs in foundational problems.In this respect, Van Inwagen initially suggests that inferences to the best ex-planation (IBE) will never decree a clear winner, but rather a winner modulo thebalance of all relevant explanatory virtues. So, what is Van Inwagen’s alternative toan IBE-based metaphysics? Most relevantly, he professes neo-Quineanism, accord-ing to which the ontological content of theories – both scientific and metaphysical –is contained in their quantificational structure. Thus, an argument for the existenceof universals will not only “back up” the semantic and belief-related data, but ratherproduce existential claims, as in the following:
(1) Any two female spiders share some anatomical characteristics.
(2) Any spider and any insect share some anatomical characteristics.
(3) Therefore, there are characteristics shared by female spiders and insects.
Whereby (3) contains a quantificational commitment to characteristics. There-fore, the difference in method boils down to the fact that Van Inwagen seeks theoriesthat are descriptive in character – they trace out statements of existence of the tar-get commitment and, if they explain semantic and belief-related data at all, they donot do so by solely postulating the commitments1.
1A worry that was later discussed is the following. Granted that (3) is a commitment to characteristics,it still seems to be a matter of best explaining some data that such characteristics are ante rem universalsrather than some other appropriate metaphysical stand-in, e.g. in re universals or tropes. Say, it isbecause the explanation of attribution in terms of instantiation grants greater theoretical virtues thanprimitive bundling that the commitment to characteristics generated by (3) is a commitment to ante remuniversals. In response, Van Inwagen conceded that he does not presently provide the full details of thea priori arguments in favour of ante rem universals.
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Indeed, it is debatable whether the envisaged strategy counts as an explanationof anything, since it is a purely accidental fact that semantic and belief-relateddata on the unity of classes obtain jointly with true quantificational statements oncharacteristics like (3). If there is an explanatory link moving from the truth of thestatements to the obtaining of the data, it may not be entailed at any stage ofthe previous argument. Aware of this remark, Van Inwagen “rests content” with hispurpose not being one of “explaining anything at all”.In the rest of the talk, Van Inwagen responded to some Armstrongian attackson trascendent realism (TR). The latter is, broadly speaking, the Platonic ante remconception of universals, according to which universals exist independently of par-ticulars, they are not in any sense constituents of the latter, losing instances is aCambridge change to a universal, and universals are instantiated by particulars bymeans of bearing an external relation to the latter. When a particular y instantiatesa universal Y, we say that y ”has” Y. The proposition thereby expressed can easilybe expressed by ordinary sentences as: ’Socrates has the virtue of righteousness’,or ’Salomon has wisdom’. So much being widely known, less agreed upon is whatmust be said about the standard objection, "old as philosophy itself", that ’has’ de-notes a relation between instantiator and universal, that such relation is itself auniversal and thus that it will require a further relation between its instantiators,generating an obvious regress. For similar reasons, Armstrong says of TR that ithas (unacceptably) “relational character”.Attempting a reconstruction of Armstrong’s reasons to call the view “relational”,Van Inwagen notices that the main candidate can be derived from the use of truth-conditional biconditionals, e.g.
(4) ’Salomon is wise’ is true if, and only if, Salomon has the property of beingwise
According to Van Inwagen, there is no special problem with TR entailing bi-conditionals of the kind of (4). What must be rather opposed is the claim that thebi-conditionals generate commitment to the constituents of the true propositionsexpressed by the right-hand side. In other words, even if ’has’ expresses instantia-tion, there are objections to this entailing the relational character of TR. On the onehand, classes of terms and predicates involved must be at least restricted owing toworries related to Russell’s paradox, in such a way that, while instantiation maybe counted out the list of genuine universals (to prevent paradox), still ’x has theproperty P’ is true if, and only if, x instantiates P.On the other hand, setting the Russellian response aside, Van Inwagen allegesthat even if we assume P and Q to be metaphysically equivalent propositions, andP to be relational, it doesn’t thereby follow that Q is relational. He asks to compareTR to arithmetical realism (the belief in the existence of numbers). Arithmeticalrealism features bi-conditionals of the kind of (4), such as:
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(5) ’Salomon is bipedal’ is true if, and only if, Salomon bears R to the numbertwo.
for some external relation R isomorphic to instantiation. Yet few would assertthat the character of arithmetical realism is relational in Armstrong’s sense, as for thelatter to follow a stronger premise is required. Namely, Armstrong should supposethat the relational character of a proposition is something more intimate than itsco-extensiveness with the truth of the sentence on the left-hand side. For instance,the right-hand side of (4) should contain conjuncts of the sort: ’... and what it is forSolomon to be wise is for him to φ ’, with φ equivalently replaced by a clause like’to instantiate wiseness’.Van Inwagen lays the burden of the proof on Armstrongians in this respect, buthe also thinks that their prospects of succeeding in the task are weak. For, healleges, ’What is it for A and B both to be white?’ has only two answers, noneof which is metaphysical. The first is an efficient causal answer, which points atentities that cause both A and B white; the other is a formal causal answer, whichpoints at the reason why both A and B are white. For Van Inwagen, neither answerbears a metaphysical content, to the effect that there is no metaphysical feature nora causal agent underlying the ’joint’ whiteness of A and B. This is unsurprising if weconsider Armstrong’s original formulation of the problem of universals, which askshow it can be that two or more individuals have the same properties. Recall that,for Van Inwagen, simply postulating universals as filling the role of an underlyingmetaphysical answer to the efficient causal and formal causal questions, is an adhoc strategy.In response, one may initially wonder whether the approach does not beg thequestion against Armstrong’s formulation. For A and B being both white may justconsist in the fact that they instantiate the same universal. In general, it is not clearwhy the existence of a unique relatum of instantiation for both A and B may itselfnot provide the sought answer. Perhaps Van Inwagen would insist that entities likeuniversals do not have causal powers at all – as it is odd to think of a universal ascausing the common whiteness of A and B in the same sense in which the coffeefalling from my cup causes a stain to appear on my shirt. But this is controversial,insofar as causation is controversial. An ante rem universal is best conceived asan entity lacking causal powers. However, very often causation is treated as arelation between events, in which case the event of a universal being related to itsinstantiator causes the event of the instantiator bearing the property identified withthe universal. Thus, there seems to be room for contesting the premise that the onlyanswers to the above questions appeals to the causal powers of non-metaphysicalentities.Alternatively, Van Inwagen could allege not that the only answers appeal tonon-metaphysical entities but that the best answers do. For instance, we tend to
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favour biological or physical explanations over metaphysical explanations, in whichcase the latter would be trumped by the former. In response, however, it is not clearwhy the existence of biological or physical explanations would trump the existenceof a metaphysical explanation, as opposed to both kinds of explanation qualifyingas viable alternatives. In particular, often biological and physical explanations arenot mutually exclusive, and so it could equally be with respect to metaphysicalexplanations2Finally, as for Van Inwagen’s claim that TR requires only the truth of a non-relational proposition, some commentators have wondered whether he also thinksthere is nothing as an ontological analysis of instantiation. While all of Van In-wagen’s arguments are against the explainability of the nature of properties (whatwhiteness is) in metaphysical terms, theories of universals have better have instan-tiation as an explanandum. On the other hand, his claim that TR requires only thetruth of non-relational propositions arguably leaves us with no clue as to where tolook for this desideratum to be satisfied.
2 Connectors vs PropertiesKevin Mulligan (University of Geneva)
2.1 Introduction
In a number of papers, Kevin Mulligan (2006a; 2006b; 2007) has argued that reality isconstituted of three levels of increasing degree of fundamentality, namely the logicallevel, which includes propositions and concepts, the logico-ontological level, whichincludes objects, properties, relations and states of affairs, and the ontological level,which includes all familiar entities we encounter in everyday life, such as things,states, processes, events, and so on. In Mulligan’s view, although not fundamental,the categories belonging to the logico-ontological level are central ontological cat-egories which are not only essential to account for intentionality of knowledge3 butalso intimately connected with the logico-grammatical categories of proper names,predicates, relational expressions and propositions. Still, in this talk, Mulligan sug-gests that a further ontological category, which has been neglected in the literature,should be added to the logico- ontological level, namely the category of connectors.Connectors are what Mulligan calls the semantic values of connectives. A connectiveis a functorial expression that takes at least one sentence to make a new sentence.Besides the familiar logical connectives, connectives also include expressions suchas
(i) ’it is true that_’;
2For instance, the idea that metaphysical explanations serve the purpose of idealising the complexityof physical models has been defended by Godfrey-Smith (2012) and Paul (2012).3On this point see especially Mulligan (2007)
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(ii) ’it is possible that_’;
(iii) ’it is probable that_’;
Importantly, these expressions should not be confused with the correspondingpredicates
(i∗) ’_ is true’;
(ii∗) ’_ is possible’;
(iii∗) ’_ is probable’;
Unlike connectives, predicates take nominal expressions like ’that p’ or ’theproposition that p’ to make a sentence. What is more, while the semantic valueof a connective is a connector, the semantic value of a predicate is a property.In light of this overall framework, Mulligan raises and addresses two main prob-lematic issues in his talk. First, given a connective and the corresponding predicate,is one of the two more fundamental than the other? And, if so, which one? Second,supposing that there are indeed connectors, what sort of realism about connectorsshould we endorse?Focusing on the truth-connective/truth-predicate pair, Mulligan answers to thefirst question by arguing that the truth-connective is more fundamental than thetruth-predicate. In doing so, he defends his view against two objections recentlyadvanced by Wolfgang Künne (2010; 2013), who upholds the opposite view that thetruth-predicate is more fundamental than the truth-connective4 Turning then to thesecond issue, he distinguishes two forms of realism about connectors, which he calls’strong’ and ’weak’ realism, and suggests that the two forms are not incompatiblewith one another. His proposal is based on two main ideas, namely (i) that eachconnector is associated with an operation or intentional attitude, and (ii) that thereare different kinds of ’because’, i.e. explanatory links. In what follows we willconsider these points in more details.
2.2 Truth-connective vs Truth-property
Mulligan’s view on the relation between the truth-connective and the truth-predicate,already presented in his The Truth Predicate vs the Truth Connective (2010), is thefollowing (where <p> is an abbreviation for ’the proposition that p’):
(1) p
(2) It is true that p
(3) That p is true
(4) <p> is true
4See also Künne (2003).
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(5) (1) iff (2) iff (3) iff (4)
(6) If (2) , then (2) because (1)
(7) If (3) , then (3) because (1)
(8) If (4) , then (4) because (1)
(9) If (3) , then (3) because (2)
(10) If (4), then (4) because (3)
Letting ’ <’ standing for the relation of being more fundamental than, from (6),(9), and (10) we can infer
(1) < (2) < (3) < (4).
That is, the truth-connective is more fundamental than the truth-predicate. AsKuünne (2010: 598) notes and Mulligan mentions in his talk, this view was alreadyanticipated by Arthur Prior, who maintains that “the word ... ‘true’ in [its] primaryuse [is an] inseparable part of the adverbial phrase ... ’it is true that’” (Prior, 1967:229).Mulligan’s main argument in favour of this claim is that combination or con-nection is a more basic operation than predication. Indeed, predication involves anoperation of ascent or sentence nominalisation5, which is not required when we useconnectives. With Mulligan’s words,
“[...] you should accept that it is the truth connective rather than predica-tive truth which wears the trousers. Instances of ‘It is true that p’ containno nominalisations, they are not the result of any type of ’ascent’. In-stances of ’that p is true’ contain nominalisations. Nominalisations aresecondary with respect to what they are nominalisations of. Instancesof ’<p> is true’, unlike instances of ’that p is true’ contain not only nom-inalisations but also refer by name to propositions”. (Mulligan, 2010:569)
Now, although Kuünne accepts some parts of Mulligan’s view – especially claims(5) to (8) and (10) – he rejects the central thesis. More specifically, according tohim, ’it is true that p’ is only a stylistic variant of ’that p is true’, which, in turn, isa stylistic variant of ’<p> is true’. In fact, so the argument goes, it is legitimate toanalyse ’it is true that p’ as an expression obtained from ’that p is true’ by changingthe order of the words and adding an expletive ’it’ (cf. Künne, 2010: 602-603). But,if this is correct, then
5For more details on ascent operations see Mulligan (2006a)
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My contention, as against Prior, is this: our understanding of (TC) [in-stances of (2)] is based upon our understanding of the truth-predicateand of the that-clause. (It is uncontroversial that our grasp of a genuineoccurrence of a that-clause is in turn founded upon our understandingof the sentence to which the ’that’ is prefixed and of the operation ofthis kind of sentence nominalization). (Künne, 2013: 164)
That is, ’that p is true’ is more fundamental than ’it is true that p’, even thoughit indeed involves an operation of semantic ascent.To this challenge, Mulligan replies in two steps. First, he restates his funda-mental point: in order to understand instances of (2) we only need to understandthat ’it is true that’ combines with ’p’, whereas in order to understand instancesof (3) we need also the ability to nominalise, which is more demanding than theability to combine expressions. In line with this, he claims that “since a creatureincapable of nominalisation can understand ’it is true that p’ but not ’that p is true’,our understanding of the former cannot be founded upon our understanding of thelatter”. Second, although different parsings of the same expression are often possi-ble, we should not forget that there are also limits. In particular, no analysis whichinvolves a change in grammatical categories is legitimate. For example, ’Sam lovesMary’ can be analysed as ’p’, ’aRb’, ’Fa’ or ’Gb’ but not as a nominal expression.Analogously, Mulligan maintains that ’p’ in ’it is true that p’ cannot be analysed asa nominal expression. Hence, ’it is true that p’ is not just a stylistic variant of ’thatp is true’.Still, Künne has a second and more threatening objection against Mulligan’sview. That is, the truth-connective does not allow us to analyse ’inexpressive truthtalk’ like
(E1) ’everything the Pope says ex cathedra is true’;
(E2) ’the dogma of papal infallibility is true’;
(E3) ’her favourite hypothesis is true’
According to Künne, it is evident that the only possible parsing of E1-E3 is thepredicative one. Hence, since an elucidation of truth talk must take into accountboth expressive and inexpressive truth talk, the truth-connective analysis cannot bethe fundamental one6.Mulligan agrees that a “truth-connective analysis” is not available in the casesconsidered by Künne. Nevertheless, he raises two doubts concerning the efficacyof his opponent’s argument. First, is the truth-predicate used in (E1)-(E3) in thesame way as in instances of ’that p is true’? It seems that, while in the latter thetruth predicate is ineliminable (in the sense that no predicate other than ’is true’
6Cf. Künne (2010: 612-13).
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:2(2015)
86
Canavotto, Ceravolo, Scarpati The Metaphysics of Properties and Relations
will do), in the former it is possible to replace it with, say, ’_is correct’. If this isthe case, then (E1)-(E3) tell us nothing concerning the relation between instancesof (2) and instances of (3). In addition, does not Künne confuse an epistemologicalclaim with a claim about the structure of logical grammar? Of course, if I know onlythat my friend’s favourite hypothesis is true, then I do not know what her favouritehypothesis is. Still, from a logico-grammatical point of view, every reference toassertions, axioms, dogmas, hypotheses, etc. which are said to be true is indeed areference to propositions which are said to be true. And, as we have seen, accordingto Mulligan, if any of these propositions is true, say <p>, then <p> is true becauseit is true that p. Therefore, inexpressive truth talk does not represent a threat toMulligan’s priority thesis neither.So far for the truth-connective. Let us now go back to connectors.
2.3 Which form of realism about connectors?
In the last part of his talk, Mulligan investigates the question as to what kind ofrealism about connectors we should endorse. As mentioned in the introduction, inorder to answer to this question, he introduces a distinction between a weak anda strong form of realism, which is based on the notions of correct operations andcorrect attitudes. In a nutshell, according to Mulligan, as names and predicates(i) refer to objects and properties and (ii) are associated with the operations ofnaming and predicating, connectives (i) refer to connectors and (ii) are associatedwith specific operations or attitudes. Some relevant examples are illustrated in thefollowing table.
Table 1:Connectives Operations/Attitudes
Basic connectives _and__or_ conjoining (operation)disjoining (operation)
Connectives with Predicate Counterpart it is probable that_it is true that_
Taking the cue from theories of intentionality based on correctness conditions7,Mulligan then defines correctness of the operations and attitudes listed above inthis way:
(1) it is correct to disjoin p, q iff p or q;
(2) it is correct to conjoin p, q iff p and q;
7Theories of intentionality based on correctness conditions are associated with Husserl. Mulligan(2007) constrasts these theories of intentionality with Searlian theories, which are based on satisfactionconditions istead, and argues in favour of the former by means of what he calls the “argument fromknowledge”.
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(3) it is correct to conjecture that p iff it is probable that p;
(4) it is correct to assert that p if and only if it is true that p.
At this point, the question naturally arises as to whether there is an explanatoryrelation between the left and the right hand sides of the biconditionals (1)-(4). InMulligan’s view, answering that there is such a relation is sufficient to endorse arealist position. Hence, we can distinguish two forms of realism: one according towhich there is an explanatory link and the right hand side is explanatorily morefundamental than the left hand side, and the other one according to which there isan explanatory link and the left hand side is explanatorily more fundamental thanthe right hand side. Mulligan calls the former weak realism and the latter strongrealism.
Weak Realism
(W1) If p or q, then this is because it is correct to disjoin p, q.
(W2) If p and q, then this is because it is correct to conjoin p, q.
(W3) If it is probable that p, then this is because the conjecture that p is correct.
(W4) If the proposition that p is true/the state of affairs that p obtains/it is true thatp/p, then this is because the assertion that p is correct.
Strong Realism
(S1) If it is correct to disjoin p, q, then this is correct because p or q.
(S2) If it is correct to conjoin p, q, then this is correct because p and q.
(S3) If the conjecture that p is correct, then this is correct because it is probablethat p.
(S4) If the assertion that p is correct, then this is correct because the propositionthat p is true/the state of affairs that p obtains/it is true that p/p.
In other words, while weak realism is the view that connectors are less funda-mental than the corresponding intentional operations or attitudes, strong realism isthe opposite view that the former are more fundamental than the latter.As Mulligan observes, weak and strong realism have almost always be con-trasted in the history of philosophy – suffice it to recall Aristotle’s oft-cited claimthat “it is not because we are right in thinking that you are white that you arewhite; it is because you are white that we are right in thinking that you are white”(Metaphysics, IX 1051b7-9). But is it really the case that strong and weak realismare mutually exclusive? To conclude his talk, Mulligan sketches a way to providea negative answer to this question. The first step is to distinguish two kinds of
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’because’, namely the normative and the essential ’because’8 By means of examples,Mulligan explains that, on the one hand, the normative ’because’ is the explanatorylink we find in sentences like ’this is intrinsically valuable because it is a state ofpleasure’. On the other hand, the essential ’because’ is the explanatory link we findin sentences like ’the proposition that it is raining is true because the state of af-fairs that it is raining is true’9. The essential ’because’ is tightly connected with the’because’ of essence, which is the ’because’ “followed by a sentence which mentionsthe essence(s), nature(s) or kind(s) of the object(s) mentioned in the sentence whichprecedes ’because”’ (2006a: 39), as in ’if x endures/occurs/obtains/is alive/enjoys in-tentional existence..., then this is because of the essence of x’ (ibidem). Mulligan’sidea is then that weak and strong realism are claims involving different kinds of’because’, namely essential and normative ‘because’ respectively. As such, they arenot mutually exclusive positions.
Weak realism
(W1) If p or q, then this is because it is correct to disjoin p, q.
(W2) If p and q, then this is because it is correct to conjoin p, q.
(W3) If it is probable that p, then this is because the conjecture that p is correct.
(W4∗) If the proposition that p is true/the state of affairs that p obtains/it is truethat p/p, then this is becauseessential + essence the assertion that p is correct.
Strong realism
(S1) If it is correct to disjoin p, q, then this is correct because p or q.
(S2) If it is correct to conjoin p, q, then this is correct because p and q.
(S3) If the conjecture that p is correct, then this is correct because it is probablethat p.
(S4∗) If the assertion that p is correct, then this is correct becausenormative the propo-sition that p is true/the state of affairs that p obtains/it is true that p/p.
In light of this, we can conclude that Mulligan’s answer to our initial question“provided that there are connectors, what sort of realism about these entities shouldwe endorse?” is actually that we are not forced to make a choice: if there are con-nectors, we can be either strong or weak realists about them, but also consistentlyboth.
8See also Mulligan (2006a: 40ff).9Mulligan suggests that the essential because is related to what Künne (2003: 154) calls the con-ceptual because, which is the link that subsits between two expressions when the second elucidates thesense of the first. An instance of this kind of because is the one appearing in the sentence ’he is yourfirst cousin because he is a child of a sibling of one of your parents’.
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3 On The Nature of TropesAnna Sofia Maurin (University of Gothenburg)
Anna-Sofia Maurin’s talk addresses a family of long-standing objections against thenotion of tropes. Such objections appeal to the alleged problems we face whentrying to clearly delineate the very nature of tropes. The idea is that in doing so,we end up either with an untenable conception of tropes or with one that cannotplay the theoretical role it was supposed to.The structure of the paper is the following. First, the alleged theoretical meritsof tropes are listed. If tropes indeed have such merits, then they can constitutethe ’perfect compromise’ we need in order to effectively account both for propertiesand for the material ’furniture’ of the world in a one-category ontology. Second,two important objections to trope theory are presented in detail. In a nutshell, ifthe objections go through then we just cannot have that perfect compromise anda consistent notion of the nature of tropes. Finally, a complex counterargument is
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advanced. Both objections are shown to require a particular notion of the distinctionbetween object-like entities and property-like entities.But – so the thought goes – we cannot make much sense of that distinction inthe way that is needed in order for the objection to go through. Also, we have analternative way to understand that distinction – one that, if accepted, does not ruleout the idea that tropes provide the perfect compromise they are supposed to.As for the first point, a theory that takes tropes to be the (only) entities outof which everything is made up seems to have merits that other one-category on-tologies cannot afford. For a realist who takes universals as the only category ofexistents faces problems in justifying the evidence that the world consists (at leastin part) of concrete objects. The concrete individual objects that solely exist ac-cording to the austere nominalist, on the other hand, look unsuited when we aimto account for the qualitative character of the world and for resemblance relationsbetween objects. Nothing like this, it seems, threatens the trope theorist. In effect,by being qualitative (or ’property-like’) tropes can provide an account of the quali-tative features of the world and of the resemblance relations between objects. Also,by being particular and concrete (or ’object-like’) tropes can qualify as that out ofwhich everything else is made up. The result is a strictly parsimonious ontology,which accommodates a non-regressive theory of resemblance and need not embedthe bizarre spatiotemporal behaviour that is usually ascribed to universals.Unfortunately though, the very idea that tropes can occupy that intermediatemetaphysical position between objects and properties gives rise to some importantobjections. The overall impact of such objections is recollected as follows.
(1) Whatever trope theorists claim they do, what they actually do is introducetropes either as a kind-of-property or as a kind-of-object.
(2) The difference between being-a-kind-of-property and being-a-kind-of-objectis so significant that tropes must be understood as either.
(3) Therefore: Tropes do not provide the perfect compromise they are supposedto.
(4) Attempts to distinguish tropes-as-properties from tropes-as-objects revealsthat none of these conceptions is a way that tropes can (or should) be.
(5) Therefore: trope theory should be abandoned.
Claim 1. seems to be quite indisputable. As a matter of fact, trope theoristsdivide when it comes to describe the nature of tropes. Those who can be said toconceive tropes as kind-of-objects see them as the world’s ’building blocks’, anddownplay their role as ’way things are’; they hold that tropes exist as independentbeings, not essentially dependent on the objects they ’build’ and, therefore, trans-ferable – some go as far as to accept the possibility of object-free or ’free floating’
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:2(2015)
91
Canavotto, Ceravolo, Scarpati The Metaphysics of Properties and Relations
tropes. Finally, they refer to tropes with bare demonstratives or proper names. Bycontrast, those who favour a kind-of-property conception take tropes to be essen-tial ’characterizers’ of objects; they downgrade or openly deny the idea that tropescan be parts of the concrete particulars they make up, and understand concreteparticulars along substrate-attribute lines. They claim that tropes are existentiallydependent or non-sufficient – hence strongly non-transferable, and refer to themonly via nominalizations.Claim 2. is not questioned during Maurin’s talk either. Her aim is rather toreject 3., 4., and 5. To this aim, she focuses on two ways the whole objection wasadvanced in the literature.The first one was developed by Arkadius Chrudzimski. According to Chrudzimski,if tropes are a kind-of-property then they must be bearer-specific, in which casethey must have a propositional structure. On the other hand, if tropes are a kind-of-object then they must not be bearer-specific: they must be simple and unstructured.Obviously tropes cannot be both structured and unstructured; hence, they must beconceptualized as either a kind-of-property or a kind-of-object. However, if tropesare propositionally structured then trope theory collapse into state-of-affairs theoryand becomes thereby metaphysically uninteresting. And if tropes are simple, tropetheory is unable to provide truthmakers for most cases – for instance, we couldnot appeal to them in order to explain what makes it the case that two individualproperties of distinct objects resemble each other in a given respect as opposed toanother. Chrudzimski draw the inference that trope theory must be rejected.Second, according to Robert Garcia a similar problem arises when we try toclarify how tropes are supposed to ground the character of concrete particulars. Iftropes are a kind-of-object, he says, then concrete particulars have their charactergrounded in them because the tropes have the character they do; hence, tropes mustbe self-exemplifying. If tropes are a kind-of-property, instead, concrete particularshave their character grounded in them because tropes make concrete particularshave the character they have; in this case, tropes must be non-self-exemplifying.Therefore, once again, tropes must be either a kind-of-property or a kind-of-object.For nothing can both self-exemplify and not self-exemplify. Unluckily though, eitherway to characterize tropes would make the theory unpalatable: if tropes are notself-exemplifying then we need to accept bare particulars. And if they are self-exemplifying (i.e., if tropes are a kind-of-objects) then the theory ends up with anembarrassing amount of objects and with the same Goodmanesque problems thatthe austere nominalist faces. So Garcia infers that trope theory must be rejected aswell.Now, according to Maurin, both objections depend on the acceptance of:
(i) a certain understanding of what being-a-kind-of-property and being-a-kind-of-object entails;
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(ii) ii. the idea that if (i) is granted then some consequences follow as concernsthe nature of tropes.
Maurin then proceeds to question both points.As for (i), she argues, according to tropes’ critics to be a property is to be someway that cannot be there without the object the property pertains to; it is a conditionin which objects are; it is to be bearer specific and essentially ’charactering’. Tobe an object, on the other hand, is conceived as to not be a property. Their mainpoint, she suggests, is to show that tropes-as-properties, as opposed to tropes-as-objects, are ways things are. However, such a distinction cannot be justifiedin any of the ways that trope critics have suggested. It is not the case that onlytropes-as-properties are character-grounders, for:
- tropes-as-objects make concrete particulars have the character they have as well;
- it may be that both thick and thin parts of an object make it have the characterit has (the latter role can well be played by tropes-as-objects, the latter bytropes-as-properties);
- it is not utterly clear what ’grounding the nature of’ is supposed to mean.
Moreover, it is not the case (as the opponent may be tempted to argue) that onlytropes-as-objects can have properties. A distinction in terms of self-exemplificationdoes not clarify the point either. In effect, suppose a given trope exemplifies itself.Then either:
(a) it is complexly structured, or
(b) it exemplifies a second-order trope, or
(c) it exists, being primitively what it is.
If (a), the trope must be either infinitely complex or in part constituted by a non-self-exemplified trope – or, otherwise, trope theory must be combined with universalrealism.If (b), either when the trope exists an infinitely complex state of affairs exist aswell, or t exemplifies itself by having its nature given to it by a non-self-exemplifyingtrope – or, otherwise, trope theory must be combined with universal realism.If (c), then it is not at all clear what the difference between tropes-as-propertiesand tropes-as-objects amounts to.On the other hand, if we suppose that a trope does not exemplify itself, theneither it has no nature in itself, or it has some nature, but such nature is one thatit does not impart on its bearer. And of neither option much sense can be made.However, Maurin argues, we have an alternative: we can conceive of the distinc-tion between object-like entities and property-like entities in terms of dependence.
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In this sense, we could say that tropes-as-properties depend on the object theypertain to, while tropes-as-objects do not. If we go this way, we can capture therelevant intuition without imparting tropes with a propositional structure or leavingthem without a nature of their own. Therefore, this is not an account from whichit follows that tropes cannot be characterized as either a kind-of-properties or akind-of-objects. In conclusion, claims (3), (4), and (5) of the objection addressed donot go through. For, even if (2) is granted – that is, even if tropes must indeed becharacterized as either a-kind-of-properties or a-kind-of-objects – an account ofthat distinction is available such that tropes can be characterized in either of thoseways. Also, such an account seems to prove more coherent and explicative than theones that tropes’ critics would need to assume. In conclusion, there seems to be nosufficient reason to think that tropes cannot provide the perfect compromise theywere supposed to.
4 Graph Metaphysics Cannot Solve the DispositionalEssentialist’s Circularity/Regress ProblemRalph Busse (Universität Mainz)
Ralph Busse is a Lewisian attentive to the metaphysics of graph theory, which is sounusual to begin with as to generate the suspect that he is up to some espionagetactic in the non-Lewisians’ camp. As is well-known, the name of Lewis is associatedto the thesis of Humean supervenience, the contingency of all property connections.On the other hand, appeals to graph-theoretic considerations are normally takento justify necessary connections that exist from the word go. Usually the argumentfor the existence of necessary connections is a simple appeal to current mainstreamphysics endorsing modally laden laws of nature as opposed to metaphysically con-tingent regularities – but the matter is quite controversial (see Esfeld 2008, Ladyman2010). Also, being the anti-Lewisian camp populated by a variety of stand-ins formodally laden connections, a Lewisian can but focus on a small corner to expresshis critical aims. In this respect, Busse’s focus is on Alexander Bird’s (2009) disposi-tional essentialism (DE), the non-Lewisian thesis that every fundamental propertyis essentially dispositional and that dispositional properties are analysed via theirbeing necessarily manifested under appropriate stimuli. A popular objection to DEholds that an analysis of fundamental properties given in fully relational terms isviciously circular. According to Busse, some graph-theoretic attempts envisagedto bypass the circularity are ineffective. Thus, the initial suspect was well-placed:Busse is an infiltrator of the non-Lewisian camp. He will be charitable toward non-Lewisians on properties and laws, and eventually stab them by showing that theirenvisaged strategy against the circularity objection turn brings to a dead end.In Bird’s view, a particle’s mass and charge will respectively be a tendency to
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gravitationally attract particles at a certain distance with a force proportional tothat distance squared and to attract or repel other charged particles at the samedistance with a force that is once again proportional to that distance squared.Moreover, Bird’s properties are said to consist in the relation between stimulus andmanifestation. Busse distinguishes this conception from that of Lowe’s (2009), inwhich stimuli and manifestation individuate a disposition in that they answer thequestion “why is this disposition this disposition rather than another?”, but do notconstitute its essence (analogously to how the elements of a set individuate a setby answering the question “why is this set this set rather than another”, but theydo not constitute its essence).Even though DE constitutes a small corner of the non-Lewisian camp, an ab-straction from DE’s main thesis applies to a larger bunch of views (at least to allthose that aim at characterising connections between distinct properties, e.g., be-tween charge and attraction/repulsion, non-contingently):
SDM: essences of properties are not primitive, not determined by haecceitatesand not determined monadically. Therefore they must be determined in arelational way.
Consider the normally accepted implication that if F is in the essence of x, then xis necessarily F (i.e., F in every world where it exists). In the light of this implication,the non-Lewisian character of SDM is evident: no world can host a property xwithout hosting its relational essence F. A bunch of commonly repeated examplespopulate the literature: charge and mass bear their causal (or dispositional) roleessentially, whereby inverted scenarios where charge bears the mass-role and viceversa is made impossible.
4.1 The Circularity/Regress Objection (CRO)
How can physical properties by constitutively analysed by other properties? Sup-pose there is a fundamental domain of just three properties D = {X,Y,Z}. If each ofthese properties’ essences is dispositional, then each of X, Y, Z will be grounded inits stimuli and manifestation X’, X”, Y’, Y”, Z’, Z”10. However, in a world that realisesnecessary connections only within the elements of D, the essences of X, Y, Z will bemutually defined – for, in such worlds, nothing but the stimuli and manifestation ofX, Y, Z constitute the essence of X, Y, Z. Therefore, it cannot be true of all fundamen-tal properties that the only option for determining their identities is relational. Thecircularity objection dates back to the problems of functionalism in the philosophy
10An proper remark at this stage is that the analysis of dispositional properties into instantiationof stimuli and manifestation is misguided. Many have backed this concern, and especially Mumford(1998), Mumford and Anjum (2011). However, Busse’s talk is explicitly concerned with Bird’s dispositionalessentialism, which admittedly endorses a variant of the stimulus/manifestation analysis.
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of mind of the early 80s (Kim (1996: ch. 5)). Lowe (2006) expresses the worry inhis identification-based jargon, but suffice it to replace ’identity’ by ’essence’ (seeabove) to obtain Busse’s target of enquiry: “no property can get its identity fixed,because each property owes its identity to another, which in turn owes its identityto yet another – and so on and on, in a way that, very plausibly, generates eithera vicious infinite regress or a vicious circle”.
4.2 4.2 Graph-theory
Graph-theory lies on a set-theoretic bedrock, which we will briefly recall. Graphsare constituted by vertexes and edges (the relata of relations), both of which arerepresented by ordered sets. Assume therefore a theory as strong as Zermelo-Frenkel with urelements (ZFU), and define:
Graph: G = {v1, ..., vn|E(v1, ..., vn)}; v1, ..., vn are the the domain of the graph.
Vertexes: v is a vertex if there is some G such that v ∈ G and v is a urelement.
Edges: E = {v1, v2, ...|E(v1, v2)}.
Non-trivial automorphism: f(G) is a non-trivial automorphism of G if, and only if,there is a one-one mapping f of all vertexes x,y of G such that E(x,y) if, andonly if, E(f(x),f(y)) and f is not the identity mapping.
Asymmetric graphs: a graph is a-symmetric if it has no non-trivial auto- morphism.
We will make a minimal use of graph-theoretic principles. Busse himself pre-sented them in a fruitful but informal way and only little more precision has beenpursued for present purposes.In the dispositional-essentialist rendition, the elements of graphs are interpretedas representing elements of the dispositional ontology. Vertexes represent the thestimuli triggers and the manifestations of fundamental properties X,Y,Z, edges rep-resent the activation relation between triggers and manifestations. The graph itselfrepresents a dispositional net. The various elements appearing in the net may ormay not be interconnected, depending on the activation condition bearing as relatatriggers or manifestations that belong to the relational analysis of more than onedisposition.In parallel to its set-theoretic background, graph-theory can be formulated in asimple first-order language without identity. Call a relational form (RF) a first-orderformula that “reads off” an asymmetric graph’s set-theoretic structure by assigningvariables to vertexes and by having in its vocabulary a relational predicate E iso-morphic to the asymmetric graphs’ edges. Relational forms are also maximal, inthat for every pair of vertexes x,y in a graph, the RF of the graph contains Exy or its
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negation ¬Exy. RFs are far from being complex – they just are very lengthy con-junctions, which in the dispositionalist interpretation list all activations that obtainand do not obtain between a set of stimuli and manifestation relata.The next step is to address the non-Lewisian interpretation of GT. For Bird, GTinterpreted through relational structure exhibits a supervenience thesis (ST), ac-cording to which, in a-symmetric graphs, identity- and difference statements aboutvertexes are determined exclusively by the structural properties of the graph, i.e.,by the properties of the structure-making relation E. Supervenience is a relationbetween properties, but here we will be a bit careless in defining it as logicalimplication from identity and distinctness statements between graphs to RF to re-lational forms. Therefore:
(ST): For all vertexes gi, dj of any two asymmetric graphs, gi = dj only if RF(G1)≡ RF(G2).
Busse sketches the proof in the following way. Since the considered graphs area-symmetric, the permutation of any two vertexes yields a different graph (this holdsby the fact that permuting vertexes in a-symmetric graphs changes the obtaining ornon-obtaining of E with respect to some vertexes). Following, for any two variablesx,y assigned to the relata of permutation, there is a conjunct in the permuted graph’srelational form which contains either x or y and such that permuting x for y or y forx yields a formula that is not a conjunct of the graph’s relational form. For instance,if a target graph is asymmetric, it has some vertexes x,y,z and ¬Exz holds in its RF,then ¬Eyz does not hold in its RF. Since RF is a maximal sentence, it must containthe negation of each conjunct that it doesn’t contain. Hence it must contain Eyz.Finally, since RF contains ¬Rxz (by assumption) and Ryz (as shown), it follows byLeibniz’ Law that y 6= x . Generalising:
(ST’) Any two asymmetric structures that differ in their number of objects also differwith respect to which form description they satisfy.
At the level of form description, (ST)’ is the thesis that, for some graph G1 withrelational form RF (G1), there is a graph G2 with relational form RF (G2) such thatG1 6= G2 if, and only if, by exchanging two variables or constants or by insertingnew variables or constants in a conjunct of RF (G1) a sentence σ is generated suchthat is a conjunct of RF (G2) but not a conjunct of RF (G1). Busse stresses that thepoint is informative and non-trivial, as the relational forms only contain the logi-cal vocabulary of first-order logic without identity and the two-place predicate E.Moreover, E bears no initial formal constraints. What this result supposedly sug-gests, aside from the truth of Bird’s supervenience thesis is that graph-theory reallyprovides a sense for properties’ essences to be grounded in relational structure.Most of all, it is very compelling at this stage to associate the essence of propertiesrepresented by the identity of the vertexes with the relational structure represented
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by the relational form. Consequently, Bird’s requirement for propertiesessences tobe determined by relational structure will be represented by the graph-theoreticsupervenience thesis. “Victory!”, claims the dispositional essentialist.
4.3 2.3 Graph theory and CRO
“Not so fast!”, claims Busse. The graph-theoretic response has at least as manyproblems as non graph-theoretic DE. To begin with, Busse thinks that the soleappeal to relational form does not suffice for representing determination of prop-ertiesessences. For a graph’s relational form only picks out unique relational rolesthat are actually played by objects. The properties represented by vertexes are at-tributed no de re profile in the relational form, whereby singling out a de re profileis a necessary condition for determining some thing’s essence. A possible defenseappeals to the fact that (ST)’ is a supervenience thesis and that supervenience re-lations are inherently modal. While considering this response, Busse eventuallydismisses it on the grounds that relational forms are silent on trans-world relationsbetween vertexes and, in particular it does not rule out a scenario where two dif-ferent vertexes inhabit two structurally equal a-symmetric graphs in two differentpossible worlds. Now, as far as I see, this equals the claim that (ST)’ commits merelyto a form of local supervenience, according to which (Kim 1971) A supervenes on Bif, at least one A-world (relevantly: the actual world) is a B-world. Local super-venience is weaker than global supervenience in that it is satisfied granted thatsupervenience is at least actually or contingently true. I wish to focus on this pointbefore proceeding.Busse’s response could be incorrect in that it states that the variable-to-vertexesassignment performed in constructing relational forms must be performed in a first-order language without identity. This premise seemed important in the determina-tion of vertex identity by purely relational means. But if the relational form repre-sentation cannot state that variables assigned to vertexes are different or identical,then a case such as the one just pictured (in which two different vertexes have equalfunctional role) cannot be consistent with the relational form representation.Alternatively, the response could be question-begging in that it asks too muchof a non-Humean to find an argument for the relational form representation to bede re. Even prior to their subscription to the ontology of dispositions, dispositionalessentialists hold non-Humean beliefs on natural laws: i.e., they do not recognizethat alternative laws constitute genuine possibilities. And it is exactly because theyhold these beliefs that they engage in the project of supplying them with a property-ontology, rather than the other way round. This considerations should guide thechoice of a non-local supervenience, so that possibilities such as those accountedfor above turn out to be no genuine possibilities at all. More generally, localsupervenience escapes the most basic metaphysical convictions of non-Humeansto begin with. It is queer, if not question-begging, to insist that the choice of a
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supervenience notion is determined by the non-existence of necessary connections,when the anti-Lewisians (and the dispositional essentialists among them) admitnecessary connections from the outset. In general, even if DE gives a queer analysisof such connections or utterly fails to analyse them, it cannot be simply assumedthat they do not exist.Moving on, not only does relational form representation fail to entail de retruths on vertexes, but, according to Busse, supervenience relations fail to representdetermination relations. By far, the latter is a less controversial point. Identityand difference of vertexes supervene on the relational properties of graphs, but thefact that the latter are merely a sufficient condition for the former should make onesuspicious that the established connection represents a case of determination. Ingeneral, logical consequences hardly represent determination, and rather seem torun in a direction opposite to the latter. As a well-known example, consider thatwhile the fact that p & q logically entails the fact that p, it is rather the fact that pto determine the fact that p & q. Concluding, if any of the latter remarks is well-placed, then the path to graph-theory to DE (through the supervenience thesis) isnot as immediate as it seemed to be at the end of the last section.
4.4 2.4. Ways out?
Busse attempts a final rescue for graph-theoretic supervenience along the follow-ing lines. Perhaps the underlying thought has never been that of establishingthat essences of properties are determined relationally, but only that relational de-termination is no more problematic than monadic determination, and the claim ofsupervenience only represents an intermediary step in the process. As an analogy,Busse borrows the bundling operation from bundle theory and suggests that, just as,in the latter, individuals are identified entirely by the elements of their bundles, ingraph theory, fundamental entites are identified by the properties and extension ofthe structure-making operation E. For Busse, the structure-making operation musttake as input the role properties expressed by ∃y∃z... S(v, y, z, ...), a "property role"attributed to the vertex v11. However, well-known criticisms insist that these sen-tences only express determinate properties when the range of their variables isfixed (cf. The Newman problem, Demopoulos and Friedman (1980)) – to the effect
11This argument correctly assumes that bundles obtained by the properties of E should contain nomonadic properties of the relata of E. However, it more controversially assumes that the latter can betranslated into the property ’being such that there is something x such that Sx ’. In response to theproblem that similar quantified statements can be realised by any domain whatsoever, modulo havingthe same cardinality of the domain of bound variables (the Newman problem, see Demopoulos andFriedman 1980, Votsis and Frigg 2011), some authors have sought to distinguish between abstract andconcrete relations (Shapiro 1998, see Psillos 2006 for criticism). The former have, as it were, a multiplyrealisable nature, and are best expressed by quantified statements as Ramsey-sentences and Busse’sproperty roles. The latter are sensitive to the nature of their relata (so, loving is a relation betweenpersons, the loving of Romeo and Juliet is a relation between Romeo and Juliet, and so on), and are notbest expressed by simple bound variables.
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that relata must be presupposed by the holding of relations, and so they cannot bedependent or determined by the latter.Some authors have attempted to enhance bundle-theories in such a way as todo justice to bundles of sole relations. Busse turns his focus to these attempts inconclusion. Dasgupta (2009) argues that monadic universals F,G can be boundedalong with relational universals R into patterns by means of functor, for instanceF-in-R-to-G. Further, facts of obtaining (obtain(F-in-R-to-G)) and non-obtaining(¬obtain(F-in-R-to-G)) of patterns are included in the expressive resources of thefunctor language.Busse makes only brief comments about this alternative, but he refers to itsalleged problems as being “extreme”. First, pattern-formation specifies a directionof ontological priority that is not the same as that specified by the part-wholerelation – just as in Schaffer’s (2010) priority monism. In turn, the view will need toclarify how exactly a logically simple property (a part) can undergo metaphysicaldetermination if not by displaying an extreme holism. In this respect, it was pointedout by a commentator that holism cannot simply be listed as a problem of thefunctor rescue plan for DE. In a sense, holism is contained in DE from the wordgo (I take my remark above on Busse’s claim that modal de re profiles are notderivable from relational forms to share a similar spirit)12. Busse’s point seemedto concern the fact that whole-to-part metaphysical determination is inappropriatefor the specific case of complex properties, presumably assuming that property-composition is determined by logical relations among simple properties (conjunctionand disjunction)13.Possibly, the issue deserves more attention. But be it as it may, Busse believesthat functor-based solutions are yet far remote and that they utterly radicalise theidea that essences of properties are determined by a purely relational basis. Con-sequently, he concludes that the graph-theoretic thesis (see Dipert 1997: 349) that“distinct relata ... can be distinct and that this distinction can arise through rela-tions alone” loses much of its credibility. A mathematical distinction of asymmetricstructures (such as the one introduced by graph-theory) cannot show that numericaldistinctness and identity of objects can arise from- or be metaphysically determinedby a purely relational basis.
12See also Esfeld (1998: 369), for whom structures of properties are holistic to begin with in thatthey adopt symmetric ontological dependence: “Applied to the parts of a holistic system, (...) ontologicaldependency is symmetric. It is not only necessary that if there is an x which is F there is some otherindividual y which is G; but it is also necessary that if there is a y that is G, there is some other individualx that is F. What we are looking for is the sort of dependence that captures the way in which parts of aholistic system are dependent on each other”.13McDaniel (2006) makes a similar point against mereological disjunctivism, a form of mereologicalmonism according to which there is a single composition relation that is a mere disjunction of all specificinstances of composition. If complex properties are determined by logical operations among propertiesand disjunctions are less fundamental than their disjuncts, it follows that complex properties cannot bemore fundamental than their components (and a fortiori that priority monism cannot apply to properties).
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5 Outline of a Locationist Theory of PropertiesAndrea Bottani (Università degli Studi di Bergamo)
Andrea Bottani’s talk outlines a new theory of properties he calls “Locationist Nom-inalism”. The basic idea is that properties supervene on the qualitative distancesbetween individuals just as points and lines of space supervene on the spatial dis-tances between material bodies in Leibniz’s relationism.According to Bottani, Locationist Nominalism proves better than the other the-ories of properties that have been advanced so far when it comes to account fordetermination – i.e., for the relation between determinable and determinate prop-erties. In particular, it can provide a theory of what grounds both determinables
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:2(2015)
101
Canavotto, Ceravolo, Scarpati The Metaphysics of Properties and Relations
and determinates that explains why it seems unavoidable to posit a circular onto-logical dependence between a determinable and its determinates. The latter fact iscommonly (and suspisciously?) left unexplained.Bottani invites us to consider an analogy between lines and points, on one side,and determinables and determinates, on the other. Lines can be seen as orderedsets of points; similarly, determinables can be seen as ordered sets of determinates.For something to be on a line is for it to be on one of its points; similarly, wemay say, for something to instantiate a determinable is for it to instantiate oneof its determinates. Nothing can be situated on more than one point on a lineexcept by having parts that occupy different points; similarly, nothing can instantiatemore than one determinate of a given determinable (again, unless it has parts thatinstantiate different determinates). Different points on a line can be told apartby considering their order relations; similarly for different determinates of a givendeterminable. Points on a line can be more or less far from each other; the sameholds for a given determinable’s determinates. And, significantly, lines and pointsontologically depend on each other, just as determinables and determinates do.Now, in Leibniz’s relationist theory of space, lines and points in space supervenetogether on the spatial distances that occur between material bodies – ultimately,on material bodies themselves. The mutual dependence between lines and pointsis thus explained (they supervene together on spatial relations between materialbodies) and solved: both lines and points are ultimately grounded in particularmaterial bodies.Bottani suggests that a similar treatment can be employed in the case of deter-minables and determinates. Here, too, this solution would solve the circularity. IfBottani is right, then determinables and determinates supervene together on indi-viduals, and both are ultimately grounded in individuals themselves.The idea is that particulars are qualitatively distant from one another to somedegree – just as they are spatially distant from one another to some degree. Aqualitative distance between two individuals is, so the thought goes, an inexactresemblance between those individuals. Inexact resemblance is taken as primitive.Given two (or more) individuals, the qualitative distances between them come, so tosay, ‘for free’. This saves a quite plausible ‘locality intuition’: given n individuals, theinexact resemblances between them depend solely on them. Now, consider all theexisting individuals. Given them we have, by the same token, all of the qualitativedistances those individuals stand from one another. Of course each one of suchqualitative distances is a way the individuals imperfectly resemble one another ina given respect – and, we may say, the relevant respect is a determinable. In otherwords, if we think of a determinable as a line and of its determinates as points on thatline, a particular qualitative distance between two individuals with respect to thedeterminable considered can be seen as a segment on the line that the determinable’is’. According to Locationist Nominalism, given the qualitative distances between
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particulars all of the determinables with respect to which the individuals imperfectlyresemble one another come for free – and so do their determinates. And – as we said– the qualitative distances between particulars come for free once the particulars aregiven. Hence, determinables and determinates are ultimately grounded – together– on individuals.According to Bottani’s view, properties exist. Still, the theory is a form of nom-inalism. In effect, neither universals nor tropes need be posited; properties arenothing over and above individuals – they are, so to say, abstract ‘positions’ inthe qualitative space that completely supervenes on individuals. In this sense, thetheory is locationist: properties are ‘places’ in the qualitative space. And for anindividual to instantiate a property is for it to be located at a given place in thequalitative space. This is the only understanding of what it is for an individualto have a property that we need: in particular, there is no compositional relationbetween an individual and its properties whatsoever. Some of the positions in thequalitative space are occupied – that is, some of those points stand for a prop-erty that is instantiated by some individual – and some of them (arguably, most ofthem) are not. Thus, there can be – there are – uninstantiated properties, but nouninstantiated determinable. For no determinable ‘arises’ unless at least two of itsdeterminables are instantiated – just as we cannot have a line unless at least twoof its points are given.The qualitative space, Bottani says, does not vary across possible worlds, andit is out of it that all possible worlds are made up. Locationist Nominalism is thenimmune to a foreseeable objection that can be summed up as follows: there may beworlds where no particular differ from any other with respect to mass, and still wewould want to say that in such a world there are things having mass – hence, thatthere ’is’ the determinable mass.Bottani provides detailed answers to two main questions that may be raised:
(1) Since two objects may differ with regards to colour as well as with regards totemperature and in several other respects, how can a determinable in partic-ular (for instance, colour) ’arise’ from their – so to say – ’manifold’ qualitativedistance?
(2) 2. How can the whole ’structure’ of a determinable supervene on a specificinexact resemblance between two particulars?
Without getting into technical details here, the answer to 2. appeals to thelocationist approach of the view: given two individuals that stand a given qualitativedistance from each other, the determinable can be seen as a line produced by thepoints that the individuals’ reciprocal positions ‘are’.As for 1. the idea is the following (and it is, again, an oversimplification of thesophisticated account provided by Bottani). Given two individuals, a and b, we can
RIVISTAITALIANADIFILOSOFIAANALITICAJUNIOR6:2(2015)
103
Canavotto, Ceravolo, Scarpati The Metaphysics of Properties and Relations
think of their overall qualitative distance as a segment on a line that passes throughthem. By considering other individuals, we have it that other lines pass througheither a or b (or both) and connect - or, better, separate each one of them from otherindividuals too. So for instance, a line will be given between a and b and c, all ofwhich imperfectly resemble one another with respect to colour; a different one willcross a and c, which imperfectly resemble with respect to mass; still another willcross b and c, which imperfectly resemble with respect to temperature, and so on.The first line we considered thus ’organizes’ in several different determinables.
6 Indiscernible UniversalsGonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (University of Oxford)
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s paper advances the hypothesis that there may beindiscernible immanent universals. It is interesting to note that such a notion hasnot been considered in the literature yet. The idea that numerically different entitiescan be indiscernible is envisaged by many – and has raised an immense amountof discussion. But there seems to be a unanimous, yet unjustified presumptionthat such cases can only involve individuals. However, there is no incoherencein the notion of indiscernible immanent universals. Rodriguez-Pereyra starts byadvancing this thesis. He then presents two theoretical roles that indiscernibleimmanent universals can be employed for, and provides answers to some foreseeableobjections.Indiscernible universals are perfectly similar universals. Two universals are per-fectly similar when they confer perfect similarity in a respect to the particulars thatinstantiate them. Consider two universals U and U∗ and two particulars a andb. Suppose a and b are perfectly similar in blueness, and instantiating U is whatmakes a blue while instantiating U* is what makes b blue. Then U and U* areindiscernible universals – in particular, indiscernible bluenesses.According to Rodriguez-Pereyra, the first job indiscernible universals can do isto allow us to defend the Bundle Theory of Universals without committing to theIdentity of Indiscernibles. The idea is the following. Consider two indiscernibleparticulars a and b. Suppose a bundle theorist accepts indiscernible universalswhile denying that the universals that two perfectly similar particulars instantiatemust be identical. She then can make perfect sense of the situation without inferringthat a and b are numerically identical. For she is not committed to the claim thata is constituted by the same universals that constitute b. She can hold that a isconstituted by universals that are indiscernible from those that constitute b instead.Hence, she can hold that a and b are indiscernible but numerically different: forinstance, a may be constituted by the universals U, V, W . . . and b by the universalsU∗, V ,W ... - where U and U∗ are numerically different but indiscernible.
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Second, indiscernible universals can provide us with an account of the resem-blance between quantitative universals that proves better than the most creditedone we have to this day – i.e., Armstrong’s theory. According to the latter view,every two resembling universals are partially identical, and every two masses arepartially identical. Hence, given any two masses, one will contain the other as apart. And, still according to Armstrong, what is meant by saying that a universalis part of another is that whenever a particular instantiates the latter, a part of theparticular instantiates a part of the former.Now, Armstrong’s account faces three problems to which, Rodriguez-Pereyraargues, a theory that embeds indiscernible universals is immune:
(a) point-sized particles
(b) extended simples
(c) intensive quantities
As concerns (a), note that point-sized particles have mass. It follows from Arm-strong’s view that if something instantiates a mass, then it has parts that instantiatethe mass’ parts. But point-sized particles have no parts – hence, they have no partsthat instantiate their mass’ parts. A similar reasoning goes for other simples (see(b)). As for (c), consider a particular that instantiates an intensive quantity – forinstance, a given hardness. It is simply not the case that each part of that particularmust instantiate only a part of the universal corresponding to that given degree ofhardness – that is, a smaller degree of hardness. There can be cases, it seems, suchthat a particular uniformly instantiates a certain hardness – i.e., that all its partsare hard to the same degree. Hence, they all instantiate the same universal that isinstantiated by the whole.At this point, Rodriguez-Pereyra outlines an account of the resemblance betweenquantitative universals that appeals to indiscernible universals and show that it doesnot face those difficulties. Such a view dissociates the idea that universals have partsfrom the idea that the parts of a particular that instantiates a universal instantiate itsparts. The parts of an extensive quantity are thought to be the universals that wouldbe instantiated by the parts of a particular that instantiates the universal (i.e., theextensive quantity we are considering), if it had parts and all its parts had parts.The universal that a given particular instantiates will be composed by as manyuniversals of a kind as there can be parts instantiating universals of that kind inany partition of that particular. A similar reasoning applies in the case of intensivequantities. The universal that corresponds to a given intensive quantity will becomposed by the universals that would be instantiated by the parts of a particularthat instantiates the universal if the quantity considered were an extensive one.The main tenet of this view is that a particular that instantiates a universalinstantiates its parts as well. A potential difficulty is considered: in such a view,
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for a particular to instantiate F-ness is not sufficient for it to be F. For instance,a particular that weighs 15 kilos instantiates (among others) the universal thatcorresponds to the quantity 14-kilos, but is not itself 14 kilos weighty. Accordingto Rodriguez-Pereyra, this is not a major drawback of the theory he is advancing.For the theory can still hold that a particular is F if it instantiates F-ness and itinstantiates no universal G-ness such that: (i) G-ness is a determinate of the samedeterminable as F-ness, and (ii) F-ness is a part of G-ness.Now, in this view, contrary to Armstrong’s, resemblance between universals is notaccounted for as partial identity. That is, we cannot claim, as Armstrong does, thatgiven two resembling universals, one must be part of the other, because indiscernibleuniversals are an exception to this. On the other hand, we can account for imperfectresemblance between universals by appeal to partial identity. In this sense, twouniversals imperfectly resemble each other whenever it is the case that either oneof them is part of the other, or one of them is indiscernible from a part of theother. As for perfect resemblance between universals, in turn, we cannot claimthat “two” universals that perfectly resemble each other are numerically identical.For, again, indiscernible universals are a counterexample. Hence, in this view twouniversals are perfectly similar if and only if they are either numerically identicalor indiscernible.Rodriguez-Pereyra then shows that the account just outlined is immune to theproblems that vex Armstrong’s view.As concerns the case of simples, consider a point-sized particle whose mass ism. Even if the particle has no parts, we can make perfectly sense of the fact that mresembles smaller masses. In effect, we can claim that it does because either thesmaller masses are part of m or they are indiscernible from parts of m. And since inthis view a particular that instantiates a universal instantiates its parts as well, weare not committed to the idea that parts of the electron instantiate those smallermasses – i.e., the parts of m. The electron itself does instantiate them. The samereasoning is supposed to hold for all kinds of simple.As for intensive quantities, here is the case proposed by Rodriguez-Pereyra:consider two particulars such that one instantiates the intensive quantity q, and theother instantiates a smaller intensive quantity q∗. Again, we can easily account forthe resemblance between q and q∗ without committing to the idea that parts of theparticular that instantiate q instantiate q∗. q and q∗ will be said to resemble eachother because either q∗ is a part of q or q∗ is indiscernible from a part of q.Finally, Rodriguez-Pereyra considers four potential objections to indiscernibleuniversals and answers them. According to the first objection, we do not needindiscernible universals in order to account for the resemblance between particulars.That role – so the thought goes – is exhaustively accomplished by the claim thatthe particular that instantiates a universal instantiates its parts. Hence, there is noneed to hold that the universal has indiscernible universals as parts. Rodriguez-
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Pereyra counters by showing that, if three quite plausible assumptions are granted,it follows that, if larger quantities have smaller quantities as parts, then they havesome indiscernible quantities as parts. Hence, if quantities are universals, if followsthat some universals have indiscernible universals as parts. The three assumptionsare the weak supplementation principle, the transitivity of parthood, and the claimthat distinct quantities of the same value are indiscernible.The second objection has it that accepting indiscernible universals would frus-trate the only advantage that realism about universals has over trope theory –i.e., the chance to do without primitive similarity. Rodriguez-Pereyra cast doubts,though, on the idea that the only advantage of universals over tropes is the one justmentioned. As a matter of fact, he suggests, it may be that realism about universalsproves better than trope theories when it comes to accounting for laws of nature orto providing truth-makers for certain truths.As for the third objection, the idea is that, in a theory of indiscernible universals,universals collapse into tropes. The answer in this case is that indiscernible univer-sals can be instantiated by different particulars: they can be identical through theirinstances. And even if this is never actually the case – i.e., even if all indiscernibleuniversals were instantiated only once, it would still be true that they could havebeen instantiated by different particulars. Since tropes, to the contrary, are specificto bearer-specific so that no trope could have been instantiated by a different par-ticular from the one that happens to instantiate it, the distinction between universalsand tropes stand still.Fourth and final objection: the fact that universals, as opposed to particu-lars, cannot be indiscernible is just what distinguishes universals from particulars.Rodriguez-Pereyra shows that there seem to be counterexamples to that principle:concepts and numbers are, presumably, particulars, but they cannot be indiscerniblewithout being numerically identical. The principle does not even seem to capturethe specificity of concrete individuals: in effect, it seems that God must be concreteand that nothing can be indiscernible from God.
7 Attribute IdentityFabrice Correia (University of Neuchâtel)
7.1 Introduction
When thinking about the notion of identity, we typically consider claims of theform ’a is b’ or ’a = b’, such as ’2 is the positive square root of 4’ and ’Hesperusis Phosphorus’, which concern what can be called “objectual identity”. Objectualidentity is the standard identity relation which subsists between individuals orobjects. Besides this familiar notion, there is, still, another notion of identity which
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we often refer to, namely “generic identity”. Examples of claims concerning genericidentity are ’for something to be a bachelor is for it to be an unmarried man’ and ’toknow that p is to have a true justified belief that p’. More precisely, in the monadiccase, generic identity is the relation that subsists between two features F and Gif and only if for something to be F is for it to be G (in symbols, F ≈ G). In thegeneral case, φ and ψ are in the relation of generic identity if and only if for somethings x1, x2, ... to be such that φ is for them to be such that ψ.Although generic identity has mostly been overlooked in the recent literature14. Fabrice Correia maintains that this notion plays a central role in metaphysicsinsofar as a number of other fundamental metaphysical notions can be reduced toit. In particular, in this talk, after laying down the basic elements of a theory ofmonadic generic identity (henceforth, simply ’generic identity’15), Correia shows howthis relation can be used to account for
(i) conjunctive and disjunctive features;
(ii) generic essence;
(iii) generic subsumption;
(iv) generic ground.
His proposal is based on three crucial assumptions. That is, (a) generic identityis a primitive non- reducible notion, (b) features can be complex, i.e. have parts,and, finally, (c) parts of features can be conjunctive or disjunctive. Let us considerall these points in turn.
7.2 Elements of a Theory of Generic Identity
Is generic identity reducible to other notions? Correia identifies and rejects twonatural suggestions to give a positive answer to this question. The first consists inreducing generic identity to objectual identity.
(1) F ≈ G if and only if the property of being F = the property of being G.
Correia has two arguments against (1). First, (1) presupposes an ontology ofproperties, which is not mandatory: one can well be a nominalist about propertiesand hold that, say, to be a square is to be a regular quadrilateral. Second andmore seriously, (1) is in general wrong. Indeed, take the property of being a non-self-instantiated property. As it is well known, this property cannot exist, because
14Dorr (ms) and Rayo (2013) are exceptions to this tendency.15Correia is currently working on an extension of the logic of monadic generic identity, which hepartially presents in this talk, to cases in which F and G are assumed to have truth-functional complexity(cf. Correia, ms). Still, for the sake of simplicity, these latter cases are explicitly left aside in this talk.
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it generates Russell’s paradox. Hence, nothing can be identical to it, not even theproperty of being a non-self-instantiated property itself. But from this and (1) itfollows that it cannot be the case that to be a non-self-instantiating property isto be a non-self-instantiating property, against the trivial truth that, in general, tobe F is to be F. Therefore, as formulated, (1) must be discarded. Yet, the speakermaintains that we should accept
(1∗) provided the property of being F and the property of being G both existF ≈ G if and only if the property of being F = the property of being G.
As an alternative and ontologically more neutral option, Correia considers theproposal, recently put forward by Augustiín Rayo (2013), to reduce generic identityto mutual necessitation.
(2) F ≈ G if and only if, necessarily, ∀x (Fx ↔ Gx).
Against (2), Correia notes that mutual necessitation is too coarse-grained. Infact, if we endorse (2), then we are forced to accept that, for instance, to be red ornot red is to be green or not green, which is false. What is more, this consequence of(2) also clashes with the plausible principle that, if to be F is to be G, then whatevermakes something F also makes it G, and vice versa16. Indeed, going back to ourexample, it is clear that being red makes something red or not red but, of course,it does not make it green or not green. Nevertheless, Correia maintains that weshould accept
(2∗) if F ≈ G, then, necessarily, ∀x (Fx ↔ Gx).
That is, mutual necessitation is a necessary condition for generic identity (wewill come back to sufficiency later on).In light of these preliminary considerations, Correia assumes that the notion ofgeneric identity is primitive and not reducible. As mentioned in the introduction,this allows him to show that generic identity can be used to account for a range ofcentral metaphysical notions. In order to see this and to better characterize genericidentity, however, we first need to introduce the concept of part of a feature.In a nutshell, taking it for granted that features can have parts, Correia distin-guishes two kinds of parthood relation between features, namely conjunctive anddisjunctive parthood. Letting F, G, and H be features, on the one hand, F is a con-junctive part of G if and only if, for some H, to be G is to be F & H (where ’&’ is anoperator that takes features and returns features). In symbols,
(3) F 6& G if and only if, for some H, G ≈ (F & H).
For example, being an animal is a conjunctive part of being a rational animal.On the other hand, F is a disjunctive part of G if and only if, for some H, to be G is
16On this point, see especially “the grounding test” in Correia (2010).
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to be F or H (where ’or’ is an operator that takes features and returns features). Insymbols,
(4) F 6or G if and only if, for some H, G≈(F or H).
For example, being red is a disjunctive part of being red or green.Now, an easy objection to (3) and (4) is that they involve quantification over(and, hence, ontological commitment to) features or properties, against Correia’s ownremark on the desirability of an ontologically neutral account of generic identity.Interestingly enough, however, it turns out that the definitions of conjunctive anddisjunctive parthood can also be formulated without quantifying over features. Inparticular, the following equivalences can be proved.
(3∗) F 6& G if and only if G ≈ (F & G).
(4∗) F 6or G if and only if G ≈ (F or G).
Without entering into the details, Correia states that a proof of (3∗) and (4∗)makes use of the principles in the following table, which he accepts as unproblem-atic.
Table 2:A1. ≈ is an equivalence relation, i.e., it is reflexive, transitive, symmetricA2. F & F = F idempotence of &A3. F & G = G & F; commutativity of &A4. F & (G & H) = (F & G) & H associativity of &A5. if F ≈ G, then F & H ≈ G & H &-adjunction for ≈A6. F or F = F idempotence of orA7. F or G = G or F commutativity of orA8. F or (G or H) = (F or G) or H associativity of orA9. if F ≈ G, then F or H ≈ G or H or-adjunction for ≈
As it is easy to see, with this framework at hand, we can now naturally accountfor the notions of conjunctive and disjunctive features and, hence, accomplish thefirst of Correia’s aims. In particular, a feature is conjunctive if and only if it has aproper or strict conjunctive part. That is,
(5) being G is conjunctive if and only if, for some F, F 6& G and ¬F≈G.
For example, being human is clearly a conjunctive feature. Analogously, a featureis disjunctive if and only if it has a proper or strict disjunctive part. That is,
(6) being G is disjunctive if and only if, for some F, F 6or G and ¬F≈G.
For example, being red or green is a disjunctive feature.
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Besides this, there are other two desirable immediate consequences of (3) and(4) which are worth considering, namely that (i) every genus turns out to be aconjunctive part of each of its species and, that (ii) every determinate turns out tobe a disjunctive part of the corresponding determinable. Indeed, if S is a species ofgenus G, then S ≈ (G & D), where D is the differentia associated with S. And, if Dis a determinable and d one of its determinates, then D ≈ (d or δ), where δ is itselfa disjunction of determinates of D.At this point, all elements to provide an account of generic essence, genericsubsumption and generic ground are in place.
7.3 How to Reduce Generic Essence, Subsumption and Ground
Let us start from generic essence. According to Correia (but see also Fine 2015),a statement about generic essence “is one which states that to be thus and thusis essentially to be so and so” (2006: 752). More precisely, a statement aboutgeneric essence has the form ’being F is part of what it is to be G’, in symbols:F ess G. Examples include ’being an animal is part of what it is to be a human’and ’being human is part of what it is to be Socrates’. Now, in line with Rayo(2013), Correia’s central claim about generic essence is that this notion reduces toconjunctive parthood, that is
(7) F ess G if and only if F6& G(being F is part of what it is to be G if and only if F is a conjunctive part ofG)
As the speaker indicates, a proof of (7) makes use of A1-A3 and four additionalbridge principles, which connect generic essence, generic identity and the operator&, namely as in the following table:
Table 3:A10. F ess F & G &-introA11. If F ess G, then F & H ess G & H &-adjunction for essA12. if F ess G and G ≈ H, then F ess H substitutionA13. if F ess G, and G ess F, then F ≈ G associativity of &
Interestingly, from (7) and the plausible assumption that every genus is in therelation ess with each of its species it follows that every genus is indeed a con-junctive part of each of its species. Hence, given (7), a second argument in favour ofthe thesis that genera and species are in the conjunctive parthood relation becomesavailable. So far for generic essence.Turning now to generic subsumption, a statement about generic subsumption isa statement of the form ’being F is a way for something to be G’, in symbols: F sub G.For instance, ’being red is a way for something to be coloured’ and ’being green and
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observed before t is a way for something to be grue’ are statements about genericsubsumption. In addition, as generic essence, also generic subsumption reduces toa relation of part between features, specifically disjunctive parthood. In particular,the following can be proved:
(8) F sub G if and only if F ≤or G(being F is a way for something to be G if and only if F is a disjunctive partof G).
As Correia suggests, besides A1, a proof of (8) makes use of principles dual tothe ones used to demonstrate (7), namely A6, A7, plus the one in the following table:
Table 4:A14. F sub F or G or-introA15. if F sub G, then F or H ess G or H &-adjunction for essA16. if F sub G and G ≈ H, then F sub H substitutionA17. if F ess G, and G ess F, then F ≈ G antisymmetry
Under the plausible assumption that every determinate is in the relation sub withthe corresponding determinable, from (8) it follows that determinates are indeeddisjunctive parts of the corresponding determinables. Hence, as in the case of(7), given (8), a second argument in favour of the thesis that determinates anddeterminables are in the relation of disjunctive parthood becomes available.At this point, we can finally consider what Correia calls generic ground, a notionto which, besides the speaker himself, only Fine (2015) has been recently sensitiveto. Statements about generic ground have the form “something’s being F, being G,... makes it be H”; in symbols: G, F, ... < H. Examples are “something’s being redmakes it be coloured” and “something’s being green and observed before t makes itbe grue”.Now, can we reduce generic ground to the relation of parthood between featuresas we did with generic essence and generic subsumption? According to Correia, yes.Indeed, so the argument goes, the following is an obvious necessary condition forgeneric ground:
(9) if F, G, ... < H, then (F & G & ...) sub H(if being F, being G, ... make something be H, then F & G & ... is a way ofbeing H).
What is more, let us say that F and G are in the relation of partial subsumption(in symbols: F p-sub G) if and only if, for some H, being F & H is a way for somethingto be G, i.e.
(10) F p-sub G if and only if, for some H, F & H sub G.
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Then, arguably, the following is a second necessary condition for generic ground17.
(11) if F, G, ... < H, then neither H p-sub F, nor H p-sub G, ...(if being F, being G, ... make something be H, then H does not partially groundF, nor G, nor...).
At this point, if we assume that (9) and (11) are not only separately necessary butalso jointly sufficient conditions for generic ground, then, by (8), we clearly obtainthe desired reduction of generic ground to disjunctive parthood between featuresand, hence, by (4), to generic identity. Accordingly, Correia’s proposal is to assume
(12) if F, G, ... < H if and only if
(i) if F, G, ... < H, then (F & G & ...) sub H, and
(ii) if F, G, ... < H, then neither H p-sub F, nor H p-sub G, ... .
As he stresses, this account fits both his own conception of factual grounding(see Correia, 2012) and Fine’s semantic characterization of factual grounding (seeFine, 2012). What is more, (12) has two further desirable consequences regardingthe relation between generic grounding and generic essence. That is, (i) it rules outcases in which a grounded feature is part of the essence of one of its grounds (i.e.it cannot be the case that F < G and G ess F), and, (ii) it is consistent with casesin which a ground is part of the essence of what it grounds (i.e. it is possible that F< G and F ess G). In light of this, (12) undoubtedly represents a promising startingpoint for a unified account of essence and ground based on the notion of genericidentity.To conclude his talk, Correia adds a final remark on mutual necessitation. Indeed,we have seen above that, according to him, mutual necessitation is a necessarycondition for generic identity. Still, given the proposed account, can it also besufficient? Surprisingly, it cannot. Indeed, it turns out that, if we identify genericidentity and mutual necessitation, then
1. F 6& G if, and only if, necessarily, ∀x (Gx → Fx);
2. F 6or G if, and only if, necessarily, ∀x(Fx → Gx)
3. hence, F 6& G if, and only if F 6or G.
But this has disastrous consequences. To be sure, given 3., every feature whichis not necessarily universal turns out to be conjunctive; hence, the proposed accountof conjunctiveness of features fails. Dually, every feature which is not necessarilyempty turns out to be disjunctive; hence, the proposed account of disjunctiveness of
17Indeed, Correia argues, under the plausible assumption that ways for something to be F are groundsof what F grounds (i.e. ifF < H and X p-sub F, then X < F), it is easy to see that ifH were in the relationofpartial subsumption with, say, F, then, for some X, X & H would be a ground of H itself. But, in general,no feature of type A & B could help ground B.
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features also fails. Finally, 3 is inconsistent with (12). Indeed, by (8), (12) and 3, F <G entails F 6& G, i.e F ess G. Hence, if mutual necessitation were both necessaryand sufficient for generic identity, then also the proposed account of generic groundwould fails. This means that, although mutual necessitation satisfies the principleson generic identity assumed by Correia (i.e., A1-A9), identifying generic identity withmutual necessitation would obliterate the unifying power of the notion of genericidentity. This is a further substantial reason why the notion of generic identityshould be treated as a primitive and non-reducible one.
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